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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:521
to any applicable state statute of limitations and apply'that statute.
Since the alleged fraud occurred in New York, the court properly turned
to the six-year period set forth in CPLR § 213(6).24 Since CPLR § 213(6)
contains a discovery rule,25 it was necessary to apply CPLR § 203(f) as
well.20 Thus, if plaintiff had neither actual nor constructive notice of
the fraud prior to the two years preceding the action, his claim under
§ 10(b) remained timely27 even though some ten years had elapsed since
the alleged fraud had been committed.
In finding against the plaintiff the district court had taken judicial
notice of the fact that stock market quotations are published daily in
various newspapers28 and held that had the plaintiff been diligent, he
could have discovered the fraud by examining these quotations on the
relevant days.29 The court of appeals disagreed and held that the de-
fendants named were specialists in Superior Oil Stock and hence, could
manipulate both prices on individual transactions and prices on multi-
ple transactions over a period of several days. In short the plaintiff
himself would have had to be a specialist in Superior Oil Stock in order
to uncover the fraud. The issue of whether or not the plaintiff failed
to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the fraud is a question
of fact, and, therefore, summary judgment was an inappropriate
remedy.80
FAILURE TO DIscLoSE MARKET-MAKING IS A 10(b) VIOLATIN
In a recent action, 81 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a failure to disclose market-making activity in an over-the-
24 The New York CPLR provision for actual fraud is contained in § 213(g):
the time within which the action must be commenced shall be computed from
the time the plaintiff or the person under whom he claims discovered the fraud
or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.
N.Y. Civ. PAc. § 213(6) (McKinney 1972). For application of a state statute of limitations
in a federal action, see Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
25 The discovery rule allows a plaintiff additional time within which to bring his
action if the wrong is not apparent at the time it is committed. N.Y. Civ. PAc. § 203(f)
(McKinney 1972).
26 CPLR section 203(f) applies to any and all statute of limitations which contain a
discovery rule except for periods of limitation set forth in article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. CPLR § 203(f) provides:
[]here the time within which an action must be commenced is computed from the
time when facts were discovered or from the time when facts could with reason-
able diligence have been discovered, or from either of such times, the action must
be commenced -within two years after such actual or imputed discovery or within
the period otherwise provided, computed from the time the cause of action ac-
crued, whichever is longer.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 203(f) (McKinney 1963).
27 436 F.2d at 341.
28 See W. RICHAaRSON, THE LAw OF EvIDENcE § 9 (9th ed. J. Prince 1964).
29 436 F.2d at 341.
80 Id. at 341-42.
81 Chasins v. Smith, Barney 8 Co., Inc., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
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counter market was a failure to disclose a material fact within the pur-
view of section 10(b)a and Rule lOb-5 38 relating to manipulative and
deceptive devices.
This action came to the Second Circuit as an appeal from a district
court decision that Smith, Barney & Co. had violated rules lOb-534
and 15c1-4, 35 by failing to disclose to the plaintiff-appellee "that it was
making a market in the securities it sold [plaintiff] in the over-the-
counter market."3 6 Plaintiff, at the time of the alleged violations, was a
musical director of a local radio station which was sponsored by the
defendant brokerage firm.87 Four transactions occurred and plaintiff
complained of all four. Apparently in each transaction, the defendant
acted in a dual capacity of stockbroker and principal. Although the
defendant disclosed its dual capacity in the confirmation slips which it
sent to plaintiff, it never revealed its role as a market-maker in the
stocks involved in the transactions3 The district court awarded the
plaintiff $18,616.64 in damages. The amount was computed as the
difference between the price at which the plaintiff purchased the secu-
82 See note 1 supra.
Z3 See note 2 supra.
84 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970) provides as follows:
Rule lOb-5. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
35 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-4 (1970) provides:
Rule 15cl-4. Confirmation of Transactions.
The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance,"
as used in section 15(c)(1) of the Act, is hereby defined to include any act of
any broker or dealer designed to effect with or for the account of a customer
any transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale by such customer of, any
security ...unless such broker or dealer, at or before the completion of each
such transaction, gives or sends to such customer written notification disclosing
(1) whether he is acting as a broker for such customer, as a dealer for his own
account, as a broker for some other person, or as a broker for both such
customer and some other person ....
3617 C.F.R. § 240.17a-9(f) (1970) defines the term "market-making" as follows:
The term "market-maker" shall mean a dealer who, with respect to a particular
security, holds himself out [by entering indications of interest in purchasing
and selling in an inter-dealer quotations system or otherwise] as being willing
to buy and sell for his own account on a continuous basis otherwise than on a
national securities exchange.
See, LOESER, Tim Ovxa-THE-Coulnm SECURTIES Mjuxur WHAT rr IS AND WHERE rr OPER-
ATEs 5-6 (1940).
37According to the plaintiff, he chose the defendant for this reason, believing that
he would get the best deal from them. 438 F.2d at 1169.
sIn fact, besides making-market for these stocks, the defendant also failed to
disclose that it had acted as an underwriter for two of the companies in which it
1972]'
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rities from the defendant and the price at which he subsequently sold
them before discovering the defendants were involved in market-making
activities.
In attacking the decision of the district court, the defendant sought
to show that its failure to disclose its market-making activity was not
a violation of rule 1Ob-5 or 15cl-4 in that they did not fail to disclose a
material fact and that the courts had never required disclosure of
market-making although such a practice was widespread and notorious
throughout the industry. 9 However, the Second Circuit, following the
rule of Opper v. Hancock Securities Corp.,40 rejected this contention and
stated that
even where a defendant is sucessful in showing that it has followed
a customary course in the industry, the first litigation of such a
practice is a proper occasion for its outlawry if it is in fact in
violation.41
While it is true that in the normal circumstance, a market-maker with
an inventory in a stock is the best source of the security,42 that fact
alone will not destroy the duty to disclose an otherwise material fact.43
The issue was not whether the defendant sold at a fair price but rather
whether disclosure might have influenced the plaintiff's decision to buy
or not to buy. Had the plaintiff known of the defendant's role as a
market-maker, this fact could very well have influenced plaintiff to act
in a manner other than the way he acted. In any event, disclosure would
have alerted the plaintiff to any adverse interests which the defendant
recommended the plaintiff invest. It also failed to disclose the amount it as principal
paid for the securities. 438 F.2d at 1169-70.
39438 F.2d at 1171.
40250 F. Supp. 668, 676 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966).
41438 F.2d at 1171. The court further recognized that in any event the defendant's
contention was without merit since many authorities have stated that activities such
as those conducted by the defendant should be disclosed to clients. See, e.g., SPECIAL
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., ist Sess., pt. 1, at 385-86
(1963); CCH NASD MANUAL 2151, at 2016-17 (Sept. 1964).
42 In re Thomson & McKinnon, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., 77,572, at 83, 203 (1967-69
SEC Rulings) (SEC brought this action to punish a brokerage firm for not acquiring
the security from one who was making a market in the security, but rather going
elsewhere to acquire the security for its client).
43 The test of materiality had plagued the courts for a number of years. However,
recent significant decisions, such as Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970);
S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965), have clarified the concept
of materiality to a great extent. It now appears that the test of materiality is "...
whether a reasonable man would attach importance . . . in determining his choice of
action in the transaction in question." S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
849 (2d Cir. 1968). A similar view was taken in List where the Second Circuit decided
that a material fact is one, ". . . which in reasonable . . . contemplation might affect
the value of... stock." 340 F.2d at 462.
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might be projecting.4 4 In such a case, the investor should be permitted
to evaluate the total situation through appropriate disclosures. 45 The
court of appeals concluded that
in this situation, failure to inform the customer fully of its possible
conflict of interest - in that it was a market-maker in the securities
which it strongly recommended for purchase by him was an omis-
sion of material fact in violation of Rule l0b-546
The requisite reliance to be shown in a lOb-5 violation was self-
evident here. The plaintiff clearly bought the stock upon defendant's
recommendation, without any disclosure, and suffered a loss in their
resale. The damages which were assessed were correct. In a lOb-5
violation, the innocent party is entitled to recover his damages resulting
from the violation.47 The court rejected the defendant's contention
that the damages should only be the difference between the price the
purchaser paid less the market price on the purchase date.48 Perhaps one
real problem with this case is that it was given a narrow application by
the court which wished to limit the case to its set of facts.49
RETRACTION oF AN EXCHANGE OFFER -No COMPENSABLE LossEs
In an action for alleged misrepresentations by a corporation that
it would honor an invitation to exchange stock, when in fact it never
intended to do so but rather intended to sell certain assets in order
to raise enough cash to redeem said stock, the court of appeals affirmed
a district court order dismissing the action on the grounds that the
44 The defendant might have been caught in either a "short" or "long" position
because of erroneous judgment as to supply and demand in a certain security. If the
defendant were over-supplied, it would have been to its advantage to unload the stock.
Under these circumstances, the defendant's motivations might affect the advice it gives
to a client. The investor must be permitted to evaluate a broker's motivations. The only
way to give the investor such notice is through appropriate disclosure. Chasins v. Smith,
Barney & Co., Inc., 488 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970).
45 Id.
40 Id. The court went on to explain that it did not want to encroach on studies
presently being conducted by the SEC as to the advisability and method of disclosing
market making activities. They only went so far as to hold that in this case withholding
information was a failure to disclose a material fact. Id.
47 See, J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
48488 F.2d at 1173:
the evil is not the price at which Chasns bought but the fact of being induced
to buy and invest for some future growth in these stocks without disclosure of
Smith, Barney's interest....
49 Id. at 1174 (Friendly, J., dissenting). The dissent was not as upset with the holding
per se as it was with the retroactive effect accorded to rule 15cl-4, note 85 supra.
The dissenters felt that in 1961, the time when the alleged violations took place, there
was no requirement that one must disclose market-making activities. The dissent also
felt that there was no basis to the finding that the plaintiff might not have bought
the stocks had a disclosure been made. Id. at 1174-77.
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